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If a foreigner visiting England in 1898 [1] were to have asked that famous man on the Clapham omnibus to describe
an English market our visitor might have heard a colourful evocation of a busy market place in which crafty market
traders who enthusiastically hawked their goods in a rich vernacular were always assured of a crowd, despite the
sometimes shoddy nature or dubious origin of the goods sold; or our visitor might have heard how country folk,
rising long before dawn, drove their cattle into market pens hours before the descent of the auctioneer, and of the
astute farmers who might bid for the best beasts with a sly nod, or a surreptitious hand on a mutton chop whisker. He
might have heard of charters granted to long deceased lords of the manor whose only modern memorial is perhaps a
recumbent statue in a country church; the tale might have been of hiring fairs, where masters hired their servants at
Michaelmas for the coming year, or of the great sheep fairs where there were gathered not only the myriad sheep
whose incessant bleating denied all sleep to the inhabitants of Weyhill or Marlborough but also the drunken
husbands who sold their wives [2]; and the Celtic drovers who counted their money in dark corners and
eavesdropped on others' news to take back as gossip to the barren mountain farms in their homelands of Ceredigion
or Gwynedd, Dwyfor or Plynlimmon. And so our visitor would have heard of a rich trading culture running through
the veins of English history from the days of the Roman legion into modern times.
But if our visitor, after stepping from the Clapham omnibus, had shared a hansom cab with the learned jurist, Chitty,
he would have received a very different answer to his question. A market, Chitty would have explained, is a right of
property, an incorporeal hereditament. It is an exclusive or monopoly right to conduct a market which allows the
owner of the property right to exclude all competitors.[3] Chitty would have added that the English courts may
sometimes enforce this right by closing down those unlawful markets which inflict damage upon or "disturb" the
established lawful market.[4]
If our visitor, in marvelling at the different answers he had received, had commented in his diary how strange it was
that a nation so committed to free trade and competition as England should perpetuate the monopolies of ancient
times, with how much more astonishment might the reader of that diary today learn that these monopolies are
vigorously continued into an era in which de-regulation and competition are an article of faith with the government,
and the supreme and directly applicable articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome mandate a prohibition on certain
anti-competitive behaviour? This article proposes to ask questions about the existence, origin and extent of these
market rights and to indicate some of the inconsistencies in market law that remain unresolved despite the long
attention devoted to this chapter of the common law. It will also examine the recent failed attempt of central
government to reform market law and suggest that, even in an age of free markets, such monopolies have some
purpose.[5]
Which Markets are Lawful?
It is at this point that a definition can be ventured. A market (whether lawful or unlawful) arises in law whenever
there is a "concourse", or gathering, of buyers and sellers.[6] A market can be distinguished in fact (but not at
common law) from a fair. The former is a frequent trading event; it normally takes place weekly, but may be held
monthly. In contrast, a fair, properly so called, is usually an annual event, the origins of which sometimes lie in the
village festival held to celebrate the day of the patron saint of the village church. As a matter of law both markets and
fairs are markets; each is capable of being a monopoly.
But a caveat must immediately be entered. Not all markets and fairs are potential monopolies. English law
distinguishes markets and fairs [7] according to their origin. Only lawful markets [8] are endowed with legal
incidents which are known as the rights of market. It is the principle of these rights which entitles the market owner
to the undisturbed enjoyment of the right of market, thus giving rise to the power to prevent the operation of certain
rival markets.[9] "Informal" markets (which are not "lawful") are normally the product of entrepreneurial initiative
where market traders operate because it is profitable to do so. They lack the legal authority of a "lawful" market and
may "disturb" a lawful market conducted in the locality thereby becoming liable to closure by injunction.[10]
To acquire the necessary legal pedigree, the lawful market must be created either by a franchise, granted under the
royal prerogative, (by charter or by letters patent) or under statute.[11] Market rights may also arise by prescription
or immemorial usage.[12] As a matter of law, Sunday car boot sales,[13] charitable bazaars, some auction sales, and
even indoor "shops" consisting of individually partitioned units,[14] are all capable of fulfilling the legal definition
of a market. Unless they are operated under the authority of a charter or statute ( and, of course, few are) they are
"informal" and subject to the monopolistic rights of others.
A sham device intended to disguise what is in substance a rival market will not avail the would-be organiser: the
operation of the rival may nevertheless result in a disturbance of a right of market and so be unlawful even if the rival
market goes by another name. Thus labelling the activity as a "club", for example, will not prevent the activity from
being closed down if the court is satisfied that it is, in law, a market.[15] This is so, it will be recalled, wherever there
is a concourse or gathering of buyers and sellers a definition which is so remarkably wide as to give rise to rival (and
so vulnerable) markets in many unintended circumstances, such as, for example, where certain kinds of auction are
arranged.[16]
Markets can earn significant profits for the organiser. These derive from the charges made to traders (and sometimes
buyers) who come to the market to buy and sell. A brief survey of these charges may be ventured since it is this
lucrative revenue which provides the real incentive to market creation and operation.
Stallage or Rent
It is a fundamental principle of the common law that a franchise or statutory (ie lawful) market is open to all
members of the public to come and buy and sell. This rule does not apply to informal markets. However, whilst
buyers and sellers have a right to come to a franchise or statutory market to trade, the seller becomes a trespasser if,
without consent, he attempts to gain an exclusive occupation of part of the soil of the market;[17] perhaps by placing
a basket or using a stall in a part of the market place. His occupation of that space excludes others from it. Thus
permission to trade in this manner is required from the owner or lessee of the soil (normally the market organiser) to
use or to place any stall or barrow in the market. The fee normally charged for this consent is traditionally known as
stallage which is, in effect, no more than rent.
If a stall is erected without permission, an action will lie for the benefit of the owner or lessee against the stall holder,
the occupier of the soil, for stallage upon an implied contract.[18] Stallage is thus a matter of agreement, either
express or presumed. This is important because the right to recover it is not normally an incident to the grant creating
the market. Because ownership of the market and of the soil of the market place may be vested in different
individuals it is possible that stallage may not enrich the market owner. This is because there is no rule that the
market place must be vested in the owner of the market right; he is entitled to hold the market on land on which he
has a tenancy or even a mere licence to hold it.[19] There is some authority that if the market owner does not have
exclusive possession of the soil of the market place he is not entitled to charge stallage.[20]
Stallage cannot be imposed on a seller who does not seek to trade from a particular site in the market place. This
perhaps causes less difficulty today than it once might have done. In times past many individuals used to attend
market to sell their goods without taking a stall. The "hawker" could sell his goods free of charge. Such a rule could
cause difficulties in practice because a "hawker" was entitled to place his goods upon the ground when weary.[21]
Similarly, when making a sale he could find himself in one site for a substantial period, especially if his goods were
so popular that he was, in effect, selling continuously. At what point did he become liable to stallage? In practice,
this was never satisfactorily resolved.
TOLL
The Nature of Toll
Coke defined toll as "a reasonable sum of money due to the owner of the fair or market upon sale of things tollable
within (it)."[22]
Toll, properly so called, is a levy payable on goods sold in market.[23] Originally it was seen as a charge made of
buyers for the prospect of undisputed ownership which a purchase in a public market offered.[24] Toll was thus
levied on goods and was normally payable by the buyer and not the seller.
Because toll was supposed to be collected from buyers its collection posed significant practical problems. Gradually
market owners seem either to have abandoned the system of tolls, preferring instead to replace the lost revenue by
increasing stallage,[25] or to have switched the burden of tolls to sellers. In A-G v Horner No2 [26] it was held that
such a practice was not sufficient to give the owner a power to demand toll from sellers as of right.
The Right to Toll
It must first be understood that the grant of a right of market (perhaps by Charter) did not by itself necessarily confer
the right to take toll. That right might depend upon the terms of the original grant. If these did not support a right to
toll a separate grant or franchise of toll would be required.[27] Many markets were toll free. Where they were not,
toll was collected by an official of the market.
It is true, however, that where there is a long custom of taking toll, the court may enforce it even if no actual
evidence of a franchise of toll can be found, because the right may be established by the doctrine of prescription, or
presumed lost grant. Alternatively, a court may presume that the highway on which the trading takes place was
dedicated subject to the right to exact tolls for trading thereon.[28]
These traditional revenues are supplemented in modern markets (such as car boot sales) by a small charge made of
individual buyers entering the market. This charge is lawful because these markets are not franchise markets which
permit members of the public to enter the market as of right. The organiser is thus exercising a private law power to
charge a fee for a licence or permission to enter the land upon which the market is held.
A principal reason for these charges, which are normally of a de minimis character, is that mere imposition of a
charge, of itself, takes the market outside the statutory street trading regime.[29] If no charge were imposed, the local
authority could take steps, in effect to prohibit the market. One means of doing so is to designate the market area as a
prohibited street so that anyone trading therein would commit an offence.[30]
In sum, the very significant profits which can be gained from organising markets have led to considerable expansion
in unlawful market activity and a renewed entrepreneurial interest in their creation. There are two means by which an
intending market organiser may organise a new market without acting unlawfully. The difficulty is that, in each of
these cases, his market will not have the right of monopoly; in fact its operation will depend upon the consent of the
owner of market rights in the locality of the new market.
(i) Licensing Arrangements
The owners of franchise (Charter) or statutory rights of market have a power to license or consent to others to
organise markets within their franchise area, usually in return for payment. This is commonly done by local
authorities who may well demand a percentage of the turnover subject to a fixed minimum fee. In 1993 one licensed
operation in a large urban area was charged whichever was the greater, 5% of its gross revenue or £90,000. Any
licensing agreement means that the new market is a lawful one, but it will normally lack the monopolistic attributes
of the franchise.
(ii) Acquisition of Market Rights
In the absence of such a licensing arrangement a would-be market organiser must acquire the rights of market for the
relevant area. This is usually achieved either by leasing or by purchasing an existing franchise. Whichever of the
above courses of action is chosen, the existing market owner clearly has the right to veto the organisation of the
proposed market. According to one argument, it cannot be satisfactory that this is so. The opportunity for a rival to
organise markets within a district should not be made to depend upon the consent of the individual or organisation
which has existing trading rights therein. Nevertheless, the established market owner can refuse to license the would-
be rival because there is clearly no obligation either to lease or to sell the franchise right.
Whether to avoid this veto or merely to cut costs, in practice many new markets do not have the consent of the
relevant right owner; they are markets of an informal or unofficial character which are vulnerable to the monopoly
rights of market owners. Their operation can be restrained by injunction [31]and the organisers may be liable in
damages for losses inflicted upon the franchise market.
Problems of Competition
The question is whether the state can justifiably continue legally to enforce this anti-competitive behaviour. One
dimension of this controversy surrounding the creation of new markets focuses upon the changing perceptions of the
proper roles of the public and private sectors. This is because, by the twentieth century, most market rights have been
acquired by local authorities some of whom may operate council markets for the benefit of their locality. These local
authorities are traditionally (but not universally) suspicious of entrepreneurial initiatives intended to create new
markets within their area, because some of these markets have aroused local hostility and caused public order and
nuisance problems. Such markets may detrimentally affect amenities and often cause a significant increase in road
traffic. There is also a frequently expressed concern that, for example, car boot sales provide an outlet for stolen or
pirate goods and even contraband alcohol. Some traders operate in breach of public health and consumer protection
safeguards. Local authorities are not therefore easily persuaded that new markets will be beneficial in the local
community a fortiori where they provide their own market(s). Because these authorities are often themselves the
present owners of franchise or statutory market rights they can often rely on their "private" monopoly powers to
restrain potential competition from would-be market operators. Development control powers can be added to the
private law rights of local authorities who thus have extensive powers to restrain competition. Market operation in
modern Britain is very much controlled by the public sector which frequently exercises its powers with particular
vigour where new rivals defy the law (by providing unlawful competition for a council operated market). Is this
dominance justifiable in contemporary society? To answer this question it is necessary to examine the early purposes
underlying modern law.
The Origin and Purpose of Market Rights
As we have seen, there are persuasive arguments that market monopolies are an anachronism which no longer serve a
useful modern purpose. It is important, however, to recognise that the issue is not entirely one-sided.
Markets and the monopolistic rights incidental to the right of markets were originally created to preserve public
order. Anglo-Saxon laws often insisted that buying and selling took place before witnesses.[32] These witnesses
were necessary to protect the buyer from claims that goods purchased had been dishonestly acquired. Transactions
within the market place were more easily subjected to public scrutiny; title to goods would be observed to pass from
seller to buyer, a consequence of importance not only to the parties to the transaction but also the public at large.[33]
The franchise of markets could be regarded as a mechanism for delegating to private individuals a law-and-order
function, which would otherwise have been the responsibility of the State. Such franchises were an effective use of
State power because it would have been impossible for the State to achieve its goals without co-operation at a local
level. The self-interest of the market operator provided the best means of ensuring the success of the market.
Therefore, the burden of the public responsibility of the market was made more attractive by the profit that the
market would generate for the owner. The franchise brought monopolistic rights to ensure commercial supremacy
through the exclusion of those (unlicensed) competitors who own markets and could be said (as a matter of fact and
law) to damage the success of the lawful market owner.
In the contemporary commercial environment such arguments for the continued existence of the monopoly ostensibly
look somewhat fragile. But it is possible to found a case (albeit an unfashionable one) for continuing market
monopolies enjoyed by local authorities.
As the Government recognises, the existence of a market monopoly also serves an economic purpose. By licensing
"rival" market operators in return for a fee, local authorities generate significant income for the purposes of their
general revenue. This means that the local authority need not provide a market itself, but can derive revenue from
those whom it allows to do so. This is itself controversial (depending upon one's political standpoint) because the
licensing fees can be seen either as a further burden on business enterprise, or a means by which businesses
contribute to the communities in which they derive their profits. The real issue is that the local authority's general
revenue is augmented by the arrangement thereby relieving burdens on local taxpayers at a time when central
government grants are becomingly miserly. At one level this might be politically acceptable if it were viewed as a
form of commercial activity by local authorities designed to reduce their reliance on tax revenue.
This argument, however, has not found favour with central government which, as a part of its programme of de-
regulation, attempted to initiate reforms designed to stimulate local private enterprise. These reforms culminated in
clauses 21-23 of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Bill 1994 which were intended to remove the monopolistic
rights of local authority owned markets, as well as local authorities' statutory powers to restrain certain sales outside
the market. Nothing in the Bill, however, was intended to alter the market rights of private market owners.
This seemed to turn the only argument for continuing market monopolies on its head. Such arguments as there are for
continuing the monopoly seemed only to apply to local authority markets where the monopoly can be exercised to
further the interests of good government of the local area. In essence the arguments for reform actually bear most
heavily upon privately owned rather than local authority markets which stifle competition to further the private
interest of the owner rather than the inhabitants of the local area.
Whatever view is adopted, local authorities successfully lobbied backbenchers by invoking the spectre of
unregulated markets and car boot sales, and the controversial proposals were dropped from the Bill.[34] The
Government's response was to maintain its commitment to the principle of reform. The continuing commitment to
reform means that the monopoly powers of local authorities are unlikely to survive far into the future.
The Highway as the Market Place
One difficult area, which suffers from a considerable indeterminacy, which has never satisfactorily been resolved,
concerns the regulation of markets which are held on the highway. The problems extend to street trading which is not
conducted in a lawful market. This may either be trading in an informal street market, or something falling short of a
market - perhaps the stationing of a stall or van upon the highway. This issue is important because it, in part,
concerns the limit of the statutory controls over street trading (and thereby the controls over trading in street
markets).
It is fundamental that informal markets fall within the statutory scheme of regulation under the Local Government
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982, which means that trading therein can only take place under the authority of a
licence/consent if the local authority has adopted the licensing scheme for the street in which trading takes place.[35]
However, lawful markets are exempted from these controls so that traders are not required to obtain a
licence/consent even if the street is designated as one where trading can otherwise only take place under the authority
of a licence/consent. This is because market trading in lawful charter or statutory markets is deemed not to be "street
trading" for the purposes of the 1982 Act.[36]
It is important that it is normally only in lawful markets that traders may operate without causing an obstruction of
the highway contrary to s137 of the Highways Act 1980, since their trading in pursuance of a market right has
"lawful excuse".[37] This is not so in informal markets, or trading outside markets.
Before examining the issues further it may be noted that where trading on the highway is concerned, informal
markets are normally not of recent creation. Often they are customary markets of great age and antiquity. When
compared with lawful, charter markets, they may, in fact, be of similar importance and age (but of different origin)
and yet be differently regulated.
Because the issues are complex a summary will be offered below:
i. Lawful (statutory or charter) markets. Here trading does not require the authority of a licence/consent from
the local authority. It seems that that which is done in pursuance of market rights is not an obstruction of the
highway contrary to s137 of the Highways Act 1980.[38]
ii. Trading in informal or customary markets. Here the absence of market rights exposes traders to the risk of
a conviction for obstruction of the highway.[39] The market traders do not benefit from the exemption in
the Local Government (Miscellaneous) Provisions Act 1982 and must obtain a licence/consent where the
street is so designated. If the street is not designated the trading is subject only to general highway law.
iii. Trading which falls short of a market. If the street in which it takes place has been appropriately designated
it is an offence to trade without a licence or consent.[40] The general highway law is also applicable. As in
(ii) this also means that in undesignated streets the law of obstruction of the highways assumes considerable
importance.[41] However, as will be seen below, traders operating in accordance with a long-established
custom may find that the court will presume that the highway on which they trade was dedicated to the
public subject to the rights of the traders. This means that the public only ever obtained a qualified right of
free passage. The traders have a right to trade and so a "lawful excuse" within the meaning of s137. Whilst a
conviction for obstruction is thus not possible, the local authority can designate the street so that (despite
the long-established custom) it would be an offence to trade without a licence/consent.
The above rules indicate that the distinction between lawful markets on the one hand and unlawful markets and street
trading on the other can have fundamental consequences. Were the distinctions between these classes of trading not
of considerable indeterminacy the law might be in a more certain and satisfactory state. The reality, especially in
relation to categories (i) and (ii) above, is that the distinction can be one without a real difference and that the law
has an almost arbitrary character. This is so because market rights (and so lawful markets) can arise by prescription
or under the doctrine of presumed lost grant. These principles allow the courts to legitimate a long-established and
customary arrangement even though there is no evidence that the market was actually created by lawful means. Thus
some, but not all informal, customary markets will acquire the clothes of legality. As will be seen, this means that
although, in practice, two markets may each have similar, informal origins one may be treated differently from
another and so become unlawful where the first is lawful. The same is true of other street trading, some examples of
which can be conducted lawfully on a highway even if unlicensed.
Prescription
The detailed rules governing establishing market rights by prescription lie beyond the scope of the present article,
but essentially there are alternative means of founding a customary right. The first is less controversial than the
second. In the former, a customary right of market can arise if there is "uninterrupted modern usage" of 20 or more
years provided that there is no evidence that at some time after 1189 the right asserted did not exist.[42] This means
of establishing user as of right is difficult because it is often possible to show that within the period of legal memory
the market was not conducted.
The second means involves the doctrine of "lost modern grant" by which the court will presume that a grant of
market was made but that the documentary evidence of such a grant has been lost or destroyed. This is essentially a
legal fiction because the courts will invoke such a doctrine even if they are reasonably certain that no grant ever
existed. Thus the doctrine is simply a device for preserving socially acceptable customary markets. This bold
doctrine seems to bear cogent witness to a policy of the law, which is that the courts will seek to preserve certain
long-established and customary markets and endow them with a legal pedigree where it is reasonable to do so.[43]
The fiction cannot otherwise be explained or justified. The problem is that this policy is inconsistently applied and
this arbitrariness is capable of causing substantial difficulty. Some ancient markets are deemed to be lawful; others
with similar characteristics and importance are not. The explanation for this arbitrary and unsatisfactory distinction
lies in the conflicting alternative doctrinal approaches which the courts can adopt. It is true that at one level the
courts appear to be asking whether the traders are, in some private law sense, the beneficiaries of a legal right to
trade. As indicated above, this examines the origins both of the market and the legal regime affecting the site
(normally the highway). This is described more fully below. An alternative approach allows the courts to exploit
more fully the legal fictions than others. Here the court in fact passes over the clouded and antiquarian inquiry about
the origins of market and highway respectively and focuses instead upon the reasonableness of the market use as a
contemporary rather than an historical issue. This latter approach explains why the courts are so willing to "presume"
lawful origins despite the complete absence of evidence. Moreover, if the obstruction caused by the market is a
temporary and not a complete obstruction (as might be so where the trading occurs in a customary fair) the courts
may be willing to regard it as reasonable and will rationalise this by blurring the question of origin.[44]
The so-called "hiring", "mop" or "statute" fairs, or "statute sessions" provide a problematic and unsatisfactory
example of this dichotomy. These fairs are customary events which began to be held following the Statute of
Labourers 1351. The Black Death had so diminished the working population that labourers and servants were in
short supply. Competition for the services of the survivors became so extreme that wage inflation reached
unacceptable levels. The 1351 Statute was intended to maximise the work force available by measures which, in
effect, conscripted individuals to work. At a macro-economic level, the Act legislated an anti-inflationary policy
which required magistrates to fix wages in the locality and the wages thus set would be binding upon employers and
employees alike. The annual pronouncements of the magistrates were of such a significance that masters and servants
would often gather near the court building to hear the result of the magisterial deliberations for the year ahead.
Thomas Hardy, for example, describes how when these fairs became a means by which employers could find suitable
labour, would-be employees would attend these fairs in order to find employment, many carrying the symbol of their
trade. [45] A large number of these customary fairs still continue, often as amusement fairs, their original purpose
having been superseded. They are frequently of ancient origin and yet, because they are known not to have been
created by a charter they are not "lawful" events. This was decided in Simpson v Wells[46] where a street trader was
convicted of an offence for having placed a stall on the highway during a "statute sessions" which was found to be of
great antiquity. It was not disputed that no offence would have occurred if he had traded in a lawful market created
by grant or presumed grant. The accused argued, unsuccessfully in this case, that because of the ancient origin of the
fair, the right to trade should be inferred from custom, in particular because, ex hypothesi, the fair had been
conducted for more than 20 years. His defence failed because the fair was known not to have been created by charter.
Trading on the highway was thus an offence.
Similarly, this private law approach was also fatal in Spice v Peacock[47] where the court insisted on searching for a
conditional dedication of the highway and refused to presume one where the highway was an immemorial one and
the trading only arose within living memory. This meant, of course, that the traders could not assert a private right
over the highway (because they could not establish a right which was first in time) and so lost their suit. The failure
to establish this beneficial right meant that the public may well have been deprived of a reasonable and useful
market. This demonstrates how the private law model sublimates questions of public interest to those of private right.
Private law reasoning also dominated in Jones v Mathews[48] (although with a different result) where, in the absence
of direct evidence as to the nature and scope of a dedication of a highway made within the previous 30 years, the
laying out of the highway did not divest individuals of a customary right to trade which they had exercised in the last
forty years. A prior right to trade therefore prevailed over the public's right of free passage over the highway.
However, the courts can alternatively appear to be applying a private law model but employing it in such a way as to
disguise what is in substance something entirely different. This essentially disregards the actual origin of the trading
(that is, whether or not actually created by a charter) and asks instead whether it is reasonable in all the
circumstances. This was so in Le Neve v The Vestry of Mile End Old Town[49]where for many years the occupiers of
certain property had made use (for street trading purposes) of a strip of land used as a public highway. This lay
between the carriageway and the footway. In purported exercise of statutory powers the Vestry removed the
obstructions placed on the land. The court held that the Vestry had exceeded its powers because it could be
presumed that the traders occupied the land with the permission of the lord of the manor and that, when the highway
was laid out, it was dedicated to the public subject to the rights of the traders. There was no positive evidence that
such permission had been granted, nor of a conditional dedication of the highway. It is clear that here the court was
essentially unconcerned by the origins of the trading; the only question was whether it was reasonable. This must
have entailed some implicit balancing exercise in which the court found that the trading did not unreasonably
interfere with the public's right of free passage.
Elwood v Bullock[50] is to similar effect. In accordance with an ancient custom, licensed victuallers placed "booths"
on a highway during a fair. Here again, although there was absolutely no evidence that the highway had been laid out
after the creation of the fair, the court was willing to presume a conditional dedication of the highway so that the
right of public passage was subject to the rights of the licensed victuallers.
These latter decisions illustrate how the courts will stretch established principle in order to achieve just results. Lord
Denman CJ admitted that the decision in Elwood was founded on issues of public policy when he stated that the
public's right of passage was not more important nor beneficial than the right of the licensed victuallers (from which
the public also derived a benefit). In other words, the decision was essentially founded on the balancing exercise in
which the court favoured the use which it perceived as more socially beneficial.
The reality is that this approach actually ignores both the history of the site and the origin of the market (hence the
willingness of the court to presume an origin in the absence of any evidence whatsoever) and instead focuses on the
question of the importance of the market judged against competing contemporary uses. This seems sensible. Where
there is no evidence of a charter it is surely unimportant that a market may have been created in more recent times
than the reign of Richard I. Since no individual can show a positive right to conduct the market, the issue is
essentially whether its continued operation is in the public interest. This kind of inquiry must arguably provide the
best solution to the difficult questions with which the court is faced.
It is not without significance that this approach can also be seen where the courts are confronted with giving meaning
to charter rights but in the context of modern district boundaries. Here again the courts have moulded the common
law to recognise modern trading conditions. This is so where a district which benefited from market rights has
expanded beyond the boundaries which were current at the time of the charter. Narrow private law reasoning would
suggest that sites within the enlarged district could not benefit from the rights created by the charter, (unless the
terms of the charter were otherwise) since the charter rights would normally be construed as having been granted to
the district existing at the date of the grant. But the courts have not felt bound to apply the logic of this approach.
Instead, ancient charter rights can normally be interpreted as extending throughout the modern boundaries of a
district even where it has expanded, or the centre of population moved.[51]
In conclusion, the narrow private law approach leads in practice to arbitrary outcomes subjecting all hiring fairs to
more extensive regulation than that which applies to other markets and fairs of equal significance but perhaps of
more recent date. It is also open to criticism because its focus is historical. It seems unimportant that the market,
though conducted in pursuit of a private right, is unsuited to modern conditions. For example, market rights may
attach to a highway and so legalise certain trading in an area which, in modern times, has become a busy commercial
district causing much inconvenience to traffic.[52] But the private law approach treats the continued trading as a
vested private legal right which prevails over the public right of free passage. This creates an ideological tension
with more modern and utilitarian regimes, such as planning law, for controlling the use of land.[53]
The operation of the presumptions and principles of this aspect of market law has a fictional quality to it. That the
livelihood of individual traders should depend upon whether their market was created as a matter of custom
sometime after the enactment of the Statute of Labourers or in a charter (possibly of even more recent date) is a
matter of regret. The focus should instead be placed upon whether the use made of the highway is a reasonable one
taking into account, as Lord Denman CJ stated in Elwood v Bullock [54] the benefit the public may derive from the
market, and also its duration and the degree of obstruction it causes. This approach would treat all long established,
customary and lawful markets alike. Any other approach is an attempt to forge a distinction without a difference.
Barry Hough, Professor of English Law,
School of Finance and Law, Bournemouth University
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---Footnotes---
1. The first edition of Pease and Chitty's Law of Markets and Fairs was published in 1898.
2. Wife "selling", which was a form of informal divorce by mutual consent practised among the lower classes, was
never particularly common. Where it did occur, a ritualised sale normally took place in a market or fair in order to
obtain maximum publicity. This was, of course, precisely the same rationale as early markets which were created as a
means of witnessing the transfer of title to goods and thereby avoiding disputes. The practice of "sale" in the market
place was adopted in divorce cases because publicity was important to all parties concerned. It lessened the risk that
the de jure husband would be imprisoned for debts incurred by his (ex) wife and avoided the possibility that she
would claim dower from his estate after his death. The advantage for the wife was first that the (ex) husband would
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